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NOTE
IN RE GAULT AND THE COLORADO
CHILDREN'S CODE
A MAJOR statutory revision of the juvenile court system of
Colorado went into effect this summer. This legislation,
known as the Colorado Children's Code,1 applies the principles of
due process to juvenile proceedings.
Only a few months earlier the United States Supreme Court
had handed down its decision in the case of In re Gault.2 That de-
cision applied the Constitutional safeguards of due process to juvenile
proceedings which may lead to incarceration in a state institution.
Gault will undoubtedly have an enormous effect on the juve-
nile courts of most states. In Colorado, however, the legislature
anticipated the direction that juvenile law was pursuing and enacted
the Code.
This note will examine the Code in depth and in so doing will
point out the areas in which it has embodied the principles of due
process as enunciated in Gault. In order to do this, it will be neces-
sary to first look at the decision itself.
I. THE Gault DECISION
The facts in Gault are recited at length in the decision.'
Briefly, they concern a fifteen year old boy, Gerald Gault, who
was accused of having made a lewd telephone call to a neighbor.
Gerald was taken into custody without his parents' knowledge.
His parents had no formal notice of the charges against their son.
In a very informal juvenile court proceeding Gerald was adjudi-
cated a delinquent and committed to the State Industrial School for
the period of his minority, unless released sooner. A writ of habeas
corpus was dismissed by the Superior Court and dismissal was
affirmed by the Arizona Supreme Court.4 The United States Su-
preme Court received thc case on appeal froin this latter decision
of the Arizona court.
ICh. 443, §§ 1, 2, [1967] Colo. Laws 993 [hereinafter referred to as the Code].
3 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 7-2 decision. The majority opinion was written by Mr. Justice
Fortas. Justice Harlan dissented in part and Justice Stewart dissented.
3d. at 4.
4 Application of Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965).
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The United States Supreme Court limited its decision to the
specific issues raised by the case: namely, a juvenile's right to notice
of the charges against him, to counsel, to confrontation and cross-
examination of the witnesses, to the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, to have a transcript made of the proceedings, and to appellate
review.5 The application of the decision was limited to juvenile
delinquency proceedings that might result in the child's being com-
mitted to a state insitution. '6
Extensive reference was made in the decision to the history of
the juvenile court system. Nothing in the decision was intended to
disturb the commendable practices of that system. For example the
practice of processing juveniles separately from adults is not af-
fected.7 Notice was taken of the fact that from the inception of
the juvenile court system, wide differences between the procedural
rights of adults and of juveniles have been tolerated.8 These differ-
ences were adopted in the hopes that treatment and rehabilitation
of the juvenile would be easier in an informal atmosphere. In
practice, however, that hope has never materialized. The Court
noted that the failure to observe the requirements of due process
had resulted in cases of unfairness to individuals and the denial of
fundamental rights.' It stated that the primary and indispensable
foundation of individual freedom is due process of law.'0 Its feel-
ings are adequately summed up by the statement of the author of
the majority opinion, Mr. Justice Fortas: "Juvenile court history
has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevo-
lently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and
procedure."' 1 Thus the application of due process requirements to
juvenile proceedings that had been initiated in Kent v. United
States12 was continued.
The Court began by declaring that notice which would be
constitutionally adequate in an adult civil or criminal proceeding
13
is required in delinquency hearings. 4 It stated specifically that the
notice must be in writing, must contain the specific charge or factual
allegations to be considered at the hearing, and must be given at
5 387 U.S. at 10. (The last two issues were not ruled upon.)
6Id. at 13.
7 Id. at 23.
8Id. at 14.
Id. at 19.
10 Id. at 20.
11 Id. at 18.
12 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
13 Generally, the notice must recite the specific charge, be reasonably calculated to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action, and afford them an oppor-
tunity to present their objections. See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
14 387 U.S. at 33.
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the earliest practicable time,15 in any case, sufficiently in advance
of the hearing to permit adequate preparation of the case.' " Even
though Mrs. Gault actually knew of the nature of the charges
against her son, the majority felt her knowledge did not excuse the
lack of adequate notice and was not a waiver of the requirement of
notice. 7 It was pointed out that one of the purposes of notice is
to clarify the issues to be considered, and as the facts showed even
the juvenile court judge was unclear about the precise issues of the
case.
18
Attention was turned next to the issue of right to counsel. The
application of right to counsel which had earlier been applied in
the adult area,' 9 and then continued into juvenile waiver proceed-
ings,2" was with this case applied to those juvenile proceedings that
carry the prospect of incarceration. 2' The Court notes that "the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that...
the child and his parent must be notified of the child's right to be
represented by counsel . . .- 22 and that the child has the right to
have counsel appointed if unable to afford it.2 1
The Supreme Court had already ruled that the rights of con-
frontation 24 and cross-examination 5 are available to adults in state
prosecutions under the Due Process Clause. Gault extended these
rights into juvenile proceedings which may result in imprisonment
and declared that absent a valid confession a delinquency deter-
mination and commitment to a state institution could not be sus-
tained "in the absence of sworn testimony subjected to the oppor-
tunity for cross-examination . "26
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination has
been interpreted by numerous court decisions to require that an ac-
cused adult be advised of his right to remain silent and that he make
an intelligent waiver of that right before his incriminating state-
ments may be used in court." It has also been decided that the
privilege applies in any adult proceedings, civil or criminal,2" and
'5 Id.
16 Id.




Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).
30 Ven T. Ut-' Stte, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
21 387 U.S. at 36.
22 Id. at 41.
2 Id.
24 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
2 Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
26 387 U.S. at 57.
27 E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).




that "it protects any disclosures which the witness may reasonably
apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which could
lead to other evidence that might be so used.' '2" Gault requires that
this same constitutional privilege against self-incrimination also be
applicable to juveniles.30
Since Gault was reversed on the above grounds, the Court felt
that it need not rule on the question of the necessity to provide a
transcript of proceedings or the right to an appellate review of a
delinquency determination.3'
As can be readily seen, Gault applies far reaching Constitu-
tional requirements to those juvenile proceedings which might result
in incarceration.
Henceforth, a juvenile must be adequately notified of the
charges against him and informed of his right to counsel, either
self-retained or court appointed. Furthermore, an accused juvenile
has the right to confront witnesses and to cross-examine their testi-
mony, and he may avail himself of the privilege against self-
incrimination.
This note will next examine the Colorado Children's Code and,
where appropriate, will point out the areas in which the Code has
embodied the requirements established by Gault.
II. THE COLORADO CHILDREN'S CODE
A. The Intake Process
1. Jurisdiction of the Court
Under the newly enacted Colorado Children's Code the juve-
nile court has a wide range of jurisdiction. 2 However, only two
areas of jurisdiction are relevant to the present discussion. These
are the code classifications of "delinquent child," and "child in need
of supervision." A delinquent child is defined as a child between
the ages of ten and eighteen who has violated any federal or state
law except traffic or game and fish laws; any municipal ordinance,
except traffic, which may be punished by a jail sentence; or any
lawful order of the juvenile court. 3 The definition, however, does
29 Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964) (concurring opinion).
30 387 U.S. at 55.
31 Id. at 58.
3 Code § 22-1-4.
3Id. § 22-1-3(3), 22-1-3(17) (a). The exclusive nature of this jurisdiction may be
subject to attack under the Colorado Constitutional Provision giving original juris-
diction to the district court in criminal matters. See COLO. CONST. art. 6, §9. See
also Garcia v. District Court, 157 Colo. 432, 403 P.2d 215 (1965). A decision would
seem to rest on whether the conduct of the juvenile delinquent can be characterized
as criminal. At the time of this writing an appeal on this issue to the Colorado
Supreme Court is imminent.
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not apply to crimes of violence punishable by death or life imprison-
ment where the defendant is sixteen years of age or older. 4 At the
same time, the definition does include any child under sixteen who
has committed a traffic offense, "if his case is transferred from the
county court to the juvenile court.'
'
3
It should be noted at the outset that the upper age limit of
eighteen has been scaled down to sixteen in the case of capital
offenses. This provision no doubt reflects a compromise between
the juvenile court's goal of serving the welfare of the child,36 and
the goals of retribution and deterrence served by traditional penology.
The Code at least reflects a legislative judgment that every child
sixteen years of age or older who has committed a crime punishable
by death or life imprisonment is incapable of benefitting from
juvenile court services to the point where he ceases to be a menace
to society. The validity of such a universal judgment is certainly
open to doubt.
As stated above, the juvenile court has no jurisdiction of traffic
offenses committed by a child sixteen or over, and only conditional
jurisdiction if the child is under sixteen. This provision might indi-
cate the belief that most traffic offenses do not involve moral turpi-
tude, and the desire to conserve juvenile court resources for offenses
that do involve moral guilt or contain evidence of future criminal
conduct. If the foregoing is correct, it is perhaps regrettable that
jurisdiction was not conferred on the juvenile court in at least some
traffic cases. Illegal drag racing, hit and run, and drunken driving
are offenses which often involve a high degree of moral turpitude,
and the juvenile offender might be expected to benefit from juvenile
court facilities. This section of the Code is quite confusing in that
there are no directions as to the basis on which transfer of a child
under sixteen to the juvenile court may be made. The Code also
states that the juvenile court may refuse to accept jurisdiction in such
a case. 37 Again no hints as to the criteria to be used are given. It
would seem that here particularly the juvenile court should be given
exclusive jurisdiction. The very fact that a child under sixteen is
driving a car indicates a need for the services of the juvenile court.38
The second area of juvenile court jurisdiction to be discussed
is that classified as "child in need of supervision." This term in-
4Id. § 22-1-3(17) (b).
3Id. § 21-1-3(17) (c).
3Id. § 22-1-2(1)(b).
37Id. § 22-1-4(b) (ii).
' See generally THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN-




cludes those children who are habitually truant from school;" who
have run away from home; who are beyond the control of their
parents, guardians, or legal custodians;4" or whose behavior is such
as to endanger their own or others' welfare.4 Such children have
traditionally been within the jurisdiction of juvenile courts, and
have previously been labelled as delinquent. 42 The change in nomen-
clature made by the Code is apparently an attempt to avoid the
stigma of the term "delinquent" in those cases where a child has
committed no real crime.
Hopefully, though, this clause will not be used as a vehicle
for the imposition of a judge's personal morals. It could be inter-
preted as allowing a judge to dictate the length of a child's hair or
the nature of his dress. If so, abuses could result.
2. Pre-Adjudication Procedure
The Code deals at some length with formal pre-adjudication
procedure. A child may be taken into temporary custody by a law
enforcement officer or juvenile court probation counselor when (a)
in the presence of the officer he has violated a federal, state, or
municipal law, other than traffic or game and fish law;4 3 (b) there
are reasonable grounds to believe that the child has committed an
act which would be a felony if committed by an adult; 4 (c) the
child is seriously endangered in his surroundings, or seriously en-
dangers others, and immediate removal appears to be necessary for
his protection or the protection of others;4 5 or (d) there are reason-
able grounds to believe he has run away from his legal custodian.4"
The probation counselor may also commit a child to temporary
custody if the child has violated the conditions of probation.4 7 The
Code further states that such temporary custody is not an arrest and
does not constitute a police record. It is at least questionable whether
such detention is actually an arrest by constitutional standards.4"
The drafters of the Code seem to recognize this by the incorpora-
tion of the "reasonable grounds" requirement. The section of the
3 9 Code § 22-1-3(18) (b).
- Id. § 22-1-3(18) (c).
4 1 1d. § 22-1-3(18)(d).
42
See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-8-1(2)(1963).
4 Code § 22-2-1(1)(b). This requirement is, of course, a departure from the general
Colorado arrest statute. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. 39-2-20 (1963). However it is in
conformity with the arrest procedure followed in most jurisdictions. PROSSER, TORTS




47Id. § 22-2-1(2) (a), (b), (c).
"See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 179 F. Supp. 636 (D.D.C. 1959) (holding that
defendant was arrested when asked to accompany officer to a nearby call box).
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Code stating that it is not an arrest, therefore, would seem to be
aimed at avoiding the stigma which attaches to an arrest, rather
than the avoidance of any constitutional requirements.
Assuming a child has been taken into custody under one or
more of these provisions, the Code provides rather definite pro-
cedures concerning his further detention and release. The officer
must notify the child's parents or guardian "without unnecessary
delay." 49 He must inform the parent or guardian that if the child
is placed in detention, he has the right to a prompt hearing to deter-
mine further detention.5" However, the child must be released to
the care of his parents or other responsible adult "unless his im-
mediate welfare or the protection of the community requires that
he be detained.""' This determination is made by the police.1
2
As stated earlier, Gault requires certain steps to be taken to
protect the privilege against self-incrimination.58 The Code requires
that no statement or admission shall be taken from the child for
use as evidence unless the child and his parents or guardian are
fully advised that the child has the right to remain silent and that
any statements given by him may be used in evidence.54 This fully
conforms with the Gault requirement.
It should also be noted that Gault requires notice of the right
to the presence of an attorney, either retained or court appointed.5
The Code meets this requirement5 6 and further provides that such
notice of right to counsel be given at later stages of the proceedings
as well.
Added insurance against improper questioning is set out by
another Code section which prevents the detention of a child by law
enforcement officers for a period longer than is necessary to obtain
name, age, residence and other "necessary information" and to
contact the parents or legal custodian. 7
If the child is not released, he must be taken to a place of de-
tention or shelter designated by the juvenile court.58 The proper
law enforcement official must then file a report with the court
3tating why the child was not released."
A9 Code § 22-2-2 (1).
50 Id.
51 Id. § 22-2-2(2).
52 1d. § 22-2-2(4).
387 U.S. at 55.
54 Code § 22-2-2(3) (c).
5 387 U.S. at 36.
5
6 Code § 22-2.2(3) (c).
57 Id. § 22-2-2(3) (a).
58Id. § 22-2-2(3) (b).
59 Id. § 22-2-2(4).
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When the child arrives at the detention facility, he is no longer
in the "temporary custody" of the police and the person in charge
of the facility must notify the parent or guardian and the court
accordingly.6" He must also notify the parents or guardian of their
right to a prompt hearing to determine further detention. 6 No
child may be held in detention for more than forty-eight hours
unless either a petition has been filed or the court orders further
detention following a hearing.62 The Code is silent as to what type
of hearing is required in this instance. The Code provides that
nothing therein shall be construed to deny the right to bail.6"
A child may come to the attention of the juvenile court in an
additional manner. If the court is informed by any person that a
child is or appears to be within the court's jurisdiction, the court
shall have an investigation made to determine whether the interests
of the public or of the child require further action.64 On the
basis of that investigation, three choices are open to the court.
The court may decide no further action is necessary,65 authorize a
petition to be filed,66 or make an informal adjustment without a
petition.67 The first two alternatives are standard practice within
the juvenile system. 6 However, the third alternative is an innovation,
and would appear to be quite useful in the juvenile context. The
court may make such an informal adjustment under the following
conditions:
The child, his parents, guardian, or other legal custodian were in-
formed of their constitutional and legal rights including being
represented by counsel at every stage of the proceedings; 69
The facts are admitted and establish prima facie jurisdiction, ex-
cept that such admission shall not be used in evidence if a petition
is filed; and 7
0
Written consent is obtained from the parents, guardian, or other
legal custodian, and also from the child, if of sufficient age and
understanding. 7 1
These provisions are designed to keep the informal adjustment




63 d. § 22-2-3(7).
"Id. § 22-3-1(1).
65 Id. § 22-3-1(2) (b).
66Id. § 22-3-1(2) (c).
671d. § 22-3-1(2)(d).
68See generally THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN-
ISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TAsK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH
CRIME 14 (1967).
69 Code § 22-3-1(2) (d)'(ii).
701d. § 22-3-1(2) (d) (iii).
71 Id. § 22-3-1(2)(d)(iv).
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adjustment without prima facie jurisdiction and without consent of
the parties. In this way informal adjustment will not become arbi-
trary and oppressive in its operation. One potential tool of coercion
does remain: the threat to file a petition if efforts at informal ad-
justment prove unsuccessful. It can only be hoped that the juvenile
court will not use this threat as a means of gaining acceptance of
what should be a voluntary agreement.
In the event that a petition is filed, the court is required to
issue a summons which recites the substance of the petition, sets
forth the rights of the child, and contains a notice of the right to
have an attorney present at the hearing.72 The summons must be
served at least two days prior to the hearing. 3 One of the require-
ments of Gault was for an adequate and timely notice.74 This sum-
mons provision would appear to satisfy that requirement. However,
some question may arise as to whether two days allows adequate
time to prepare. If not, a legislative extension of this time might be
necessary to approach more closely the requirements of Gault.
B. Adjudication
When a petition is filed the next step is normally the adjudi-
catory hearing. However, if the petition alleges an offense which
would be a felony if committed by an adult, and the child is sixteen
years of age or older, the additional adjudicative process of a transfer
hearing might become necessary.' 5 The purpose of such a hearing
is to determine whether the child should be tried as an adult in the
district court. When such a petition comes before the court, several
alternatives are possible: (1) the court may proceed as in any
juvenile adjudication and hold no transfer hearing;7 1 or (2) the
court may continue the case for further investigation and transfer
hearing if it determines that further investigation is in the interests
of the child, his parents, guardian, or legal custodian 77 or that the
child has not been represented by counsel and requests to be so
represented at the transfer hearing. 78 The court may hold the trans-
fer hearing immediately if it finds that no additional information
is necessary to such a hearing, 79 and that the child and his parents,
guardian or legal custodian have retained counsel or waived their
right to counsel. 80
7Id. § 22-3-3(1).
73 1d. § 22-3-3(7).
74 387 U.S. at 31.
75 Code § 22-3-6(4).
761d. § 22-3-6(4) (b).
7ld. § 22-3-6(4) (c) (ii).
78 Id. § 22-3-6(4) (c) (iii).
79 d. § 22-3-6(4)(d)'(ii).
8RId. § 22-3-6(4) (d) (iii).
VOL. 44
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If a transfer bearing is held, the court must consider only two
issues, whether it would be contrary to the best interest of the child
or of the public to retain jurisdiction.81 Written reports and other
material relating to the child may be considered, and those who
prepare the reports are made subject to cross-examination."' The
hearing is to be conducted according to the rules applicable to the
normal adjudicatory hearing.83  In order to retain jurisdiction the
court must find that such retention is in the best interest of the
child and of the public.84
The transfer provision may be viewed as a procedure whereby
the juvenile court may divest itself of jurisdiction in any case where
it feels that its unique services have no application to the circum-
stances of a particular case; where, for example, the child has be-
come so hardened that punishment and deterrence, as opposed to
individualized treatment and rehabilitation, seems the only answer.
However, the soundness of any transfer provision is neverthe-
less open to serious question.8" After all, the sixteen year old bur-
glar is still a juvenile and should be amenable to the same treatment
as his counterpart who has committed a less serious offense. The
Code, however, evidences a legislative judgment that this is not
always the case, and that at least a court determination is required
on the issue.
If the court retains jurisdiction, either because it decided trans-
er is not warranted cr because no transfer hearing was held, it then
proceeds to an adjudication of the guilt or innocence of the child.
At this adjudication the child has the right to a jury of not more
than six 8" and, in conformity to Gault, the right to be represented
by counsel.8 7 The court may appoint counsel without request where
it is deemed necessary.88 If a jury is not requested the case may be
heard before a referee.89 The referee acts in the same capacity as
a judge. However, the parties have the right to a hearing before




MId. § 22-3-8(5). It is beyond the scope of this note to inquire into all of the various
social and penal theories which might be included under "interest of the child" and
"interest of the public." However, it should be recognized that these concepts are
broad enough to justify a decision on virtually any set of facts.
85 Rubin & Shaffer, Constitutional Protections For the Juvenile, 44 DEN. L.J. 66, 82
(1967).
86 Code § 22-1-6(4) (a) (i).
87 d. § 22-1-6(1) (a).
8 8
id. § 22-1-6(1)(c) ("... necessary to protect the interest of the child or of other
parties.").




this right by the referee."' After the hearing the referee must
submit his findings and recommendations to the court, inform the
parties of these findings and recommendations and notify them of
their right to request a rehearing before the court.2
Whether the hearing is held before a judge, a judge and jury,
or a referee, the Code prescribes certain rules. The rules of evi-
dence provided by the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure are appli-
cable. 3 This, of course, insures confrontation, cross-examination of
witnesses, and the right to present evidence. These same require-
ments regarding sworn testimony and cross-examination were laid
down in Gault9'4 and have been met by the Code. Compulsory
process is also provided.95
Admission to the hearing is limited to those persons who have
a direct interest in the case or the workings of the court or those
individuals whom the parents or guardian wish to be present.96
This section does not deny a public trial, since anyone whom the
parents wish to be present, including the press, can attend. Quite
obviously it evidences a legislative judgment that the desirability of
avoiding unfavorable publicity to the child must, in the juvenile
context, override the general public interest in the functioning of
the court. It may, however, be argued that the provision is superfluous
since another section of the Code states that no pictures, names,
or addresses shall be published or given any publicity except by
order of the court. 7
The Code also provides that a verbatim record is to be made
in any hearing,98 an issue which the court refused to discuss in
Gault. This is no doubt designed to facilitate possible appeals
which may be taken from any order, decree or judgment of the
juvenile court directly to the Colorado Supreme Court.9 The bur-
den of proof is the same as in the regular criminal courts, i.e., be-
yond a reasonable doubt.'00 Upon a request by the court, the county
attorney or district attorney represents the state at any hearing,
including, of course, the adjudicatory and transfer hearings.' 0 ' This
would seem absolutely essential in any case where a defense attor-
ney is present so as to prevent the judge from being forced into the
911d.
92 1d. § 22-1-10(4).
93 d. § 22-1-7(1).











role of prosecutor. If the court finds that the allegations of the
petition are not sustained beyond a reasonable doubt it must dismiss
the petition and release the child from any detention or restriction.0 2
A petition for a new hearing may be made on any of the grounds
enumerated in rule 59 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure.0 8
C. Disposition
If the allegations of the petition are supported beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, the court must then consider the disposition to be
made.' 04  In making this determination the court may consider
social studies or reports made by the probation department or other
agencies designated by the court.'0 5 Parties making such reports
are subject to cross-examination on the report,' and the court must
inform the parties of this right.' The court may also have the
child examined by a physician, psychiatrist or psychologist.' 08 There
is nothing in the Code which specifically gives the child the right to
present evidence concerning proper disposition. However, the Code
does state that the court shall hear evidence and that such evidence
is not limited to the reports mentioned above.' 0 9 This provision
could be considered broad enough to allow such presentation, par-
ticularly since the Code recognizes an adversary element in the pro-
vision for cross-examination. It is regrettable that the legislature
did not set forth this right more specifically if it in fact exists.
The court has broad authority in the formulation of what it
considers a proper disposition. The disposition may embody what
the Code terms an "order of protection." The order may be directed
to the parent, guardian, or any other person who is a party to the
proceeding. The Code states:
(2) (a) The order of protection may require any such person:
(b) To stay away from a child or his residence;
(c) To permit a parent to visit a child at stated periods;
(d) To abstain from offensive conduct against a child, his parent
or parents, guardian, or any other person to whom legal custody of
a child has been given;
(e) To give proper attention to the care of the home;
(f) (i) To cooperate in good faith with an agency:
1021. § 22-3-6(5).
103Id. § 22-3-17(1). Those grounds are (1) any irregularity which prevented a fair
trial, (2) misconduct of the jury, (3) accident or surprise, (4) newly discovered
evidence which could not, with diligence, have been discovered before trial, (5) in-










(ii) Which has been given legal custody of a child,
'(iii) Which is providing protective supervision of a child by court
order, or
(iv) To which the child has been referred by the court;
(g) To refrain from acts of commission or omission that tend to
make a home an improper place for a child; or
(h) To perform any legal obligation of support." 0
Many of these provisions have more obvious application to other
areas of juvenile court jurisdiction, such as neglected children. How-
ever, a selective use of these provisions may also serve to reduce the
causes of a particular child's delinquency. If the child has been
adjudicated to be "in need of supervision" the court may choose
from any one or more of the following alternatives in addition to
those already stated:
(b) The court may place the child on probation or under protec-
tive supervision in the legal custody of one or both parents or
guardian under such conditions as the court may impose;
(c) The court may place the child in the legal custody of a rela-
tive or other suitable person under such conditions as the court may
impose, which may include placing the child on probation or under
protective supervision.
(d) (i) The court may require as a condition of probation that
the child report for assignment to a supervised work program or
place such child in a child care or detention facility which shall
provide a supervised work program, if:
(ii) The child is not deprived of the schooling which is appro-
priate to his age, needs, and specific rehabilitative goals;
(iii) The supervised work program is of a constructive nature de-
signed to promote rehabilitation, is appropriate to the age level
and physical ability of the child, and is combined with counseling
from a probation counselor or other guidance personnel;
(iv) The supervised work program assignment is made for a period
of time consistent with the child's best interest, but not exceeding
ninety days.
(e) The court may place legal custody in the county department
of public welfare or a child placement agency for placement in a
foster home or child care facility, or it may place the child in a
child care center.
(f) The court may order that the child be examined or treated by
a physician, surgeon, psychiatrist, or psychologist, or that he receive
other special care, and may place the child in a hospital or other
suitable facility for such purposes.
(g) The court may require the child to pay for any damage done
to persons or property, upon such conditions as the court deems
best, when such payment can be enforced without serious hard-
ship or injustice to the child.
(h) (i) The court may commit the child to the department of
institutions for placement in the Colorado youth center, any other
group care facility, or other disposition as may be determined by




(ii) No child committed to the department of institutions under
the provisions of this section shall be placed initially in the Lookout
Mountain school for boys, the Mount View girls' school, or any
other training school as defined in section 22-1-3 (25), but may be
transferred to one of these facilities by the department only as
provided in section 22-8-4 (2). 1 1 1
The provisions for work programs, and indeed the whole sec-
tion, are obviously designed to avoid punitive elements as much as
possible. The programs aim at rehabilitation. This seems particu-
larly desirable since the "child in need of supervision" has done
nothing which could be considered a crime within the normal usage
of that word.
The provision regarding disposition of delinquent children is
identical except that the restriction as to placement in Lookout
Mountain boys' school and Mount View girls' school is removed,
and a fine up to $50 may be imposed.1 2 Again, the basic aim seems
to be rehabilitation.113 The apparent goal is to serve the needs of
the child. The specific offense committed is only evidence of that
need. This goal is further evidenced by another section of the Code
which provides that no civil disability shall result from any adjudi-
cation made, nor shall such adjudication be admissible in any other
court." 4
D. Post-Disposition
Many, if not most, juvenile offenders are released on proba-
tion. The Code, as might be expected, provides rules regarding the
probation process. Terms and conditions of probation must be given
to the child in written form and shall be fully explained to him." '
The juvenile court must review these terms and conditions and the
progress of each probationary child at least once every six months." 6
The court may release the child from probation at any time, but he
must be released if he has fulfilled the requirements for tvo years." 7
The jurisdiction of the court is then terminated.1 18 The court is
given the power to modify the terms and conditions of probation
at any time without a hearing.' Grounds for the use of this power
111Id. § 22-3-12(1).
112 d. § 22-3-13.
113 However, as the Supreme Court in Gault pointed out, expectation may not always
conform to result. In fact these "training schools" are often nothing more than
glorified penal institutions which have the same detrimental effect on a child as they
were created to remedy.
114 Id. § 22-1-9.
115Id. § 22-3-18(1).
eld. § 22-3-18(2)(a).





are not set forth. Hopefully this power will be used only to reflect
changed or improved circumstances, and not as a tool of punish-
ment for unproved subsequent offenses.
If the child has allegedly violated the terms of his probation,
a hearing must be held. The hearing must be conducted in the same
manner as the regular adjudicatory hearing. 2 ' If the court finds
that probation has in fact been violated, it may take any measures
which were open to it at the time of the original disposition.'
These provisions give important protections to the alleged violator,
and could be considered as a model for the comparatively backward
adult probation system.' 2
Terms of incarceration or "commitment" differ between the
"delinquent" and the "child in need of supervision." But within
each group no differentiation is made as to the type of offense
committed. A "child in need of supervision" is committed for an
indeterminate period not to exceed two years.'2 However the court
may renew the commitment for an additional two years or less upon
petition of the department of institutions. 24 Although the petition
must set forth the reasons for the request, 25 no hearing is given. On
the other hand, an adjudicated delinquent may be committed for
an indeterminate period not to exceed two years with possible parole
supervision not to exceed an additional two years.' 2 1 It is difficult
to understand the reasoning underlying these provisions. Why
should the "child in need of supervision," who has committed no
crime, face a potentially longer confinement than the delinquent?
This can perhaps be explained by the difference in the institutions
to which the two types of offenders are committed.2 7 It is sub-
mitted, however, that this difference in treatment is unfair on its
face, and that a legislative revision should be seriously considered.
Any adjudicated delinquent who has been committed to the
department of institutions must be considered for parole within
one year after the commitment.128 In considering parole, the parole
board is to consider "the best interests of the child and the public."'
2 9
This, of course, vests virtually total discretion in the parole board.
'20 rd. § 22-3-18(3) (d)(i).
121Id. § 22-3-18(3) (d) (ii). However, the upper age limit for child care facilities is
set at 18. Code § 22-8-6. It is unclear what happens to a child who is over 18 and
has violated probation.
i' See, e.g., Note, Legal Aspects of Probation Revocation, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 3 (1959)
for an appraisal of the shortcomings of the adult system.




2 6 Id. 22-3-14(3) (b).







Parole, as stated above, is for a maximum of two years, with
a review required within one year.' 80 The board has the authority
to release the child from parole at any time.' Hearings on alleged
parole violations are held before a hearing panel of the parole
board after notice to the parties of the alleged violation. 3 2 No
mention is made regarding the right to presence of an attorney or
of the burden of proof required to sustain the allegations. There
is also no provision for court review, although a rehearing may be
held before the parole board.' 13 It is regrettable that the Code,
which is progressive in so many areas, chooses to follow the stand-
ard practice of vesting almost total discretion in the parole board
with regard to grant of parole, terms and conditions, and revoca-
tion. "'34 The parole process involves issues of liberty just as surely
as the original adjudication, and procedural fairness and court re-
view would play a major part in a truly enlightened system.
Any person who has been adjudicated a delinquent or a child
in need of supervision may petition the court for expungement of
his record two years after the termination of juvenile court jurisdic-
tion or two years after his release from parole.3 5 Such expunge-
ment shall be granted if the person has not been adjudicated a
delinquent since the prior termination of jurisdiction or parole, if
no such proceeding is pending, and if the court is satisfied that
satisfactory rehabilitation has occurred." 6 If expungement is granted
the records are sealed and the offense is "deemed never to have
occurred."' 37 Therefore in answer to any inquiry, the individual
can honestly reply that he has never been adjudicated a delinquent.
This is a farsighted attempt to avoid the stigma of a youth indis-
cretion where a sincere rehabilitation has occurred. As such, it




The Colorado Children's Code embodies the letter as well as
the spirit of the recent United States Supreme Court case of In re
3
0 Id. § 22-9-2(2)(a).











8 See generally THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN-




Gault.18 9 That spirit is adequately summed up by the following state-
ments of the author of the majority opinion, Justice Fortas: "Under
our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a
kangaroo court";14° and, "[dlue process of law is the primary
and indispensable foundation of individual freedom.'1'
The Code embodies the principles and requirements of due
process as set forth in Gault, and, in addition, provides safeguards
in areas in which the Court did not render a decision- notably in
the areas of standard of proof, transcript of proceedings, and appel-
late review. The Code is the product of a farsighted legislative effort
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